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Interview
A CONVERSATION WITH
JUDGE RICHARD A. POSNER
Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
is one of the most prominent members of the federal judiciary and one
of its most prolific writers. His nonjudicial writings address diverse and
1
2
3
4
timely issues, including terrorism, sex, antitrust, intelligence, the
5
6
Bush v. Gore controversy, the legitimacy of moral reasoning, from a
law and economics viewpoint that has evolved over the years to a
broader pragmatic perspective.
In 2008, he turned his attention to judges and how they do their
7
jobs. Judge Posner’s book, How Judges Think, takes up the prevailing
theories about what motivates judges’ decisions and adds his own,
heavily grounded in the notion that judges’ experiences and
backgrounds play a large role where decision outcomes are uncertain.
Judges—at least the vast majority—are pragmatists, seeking to
maximize various goals within a legal tradition that imposes its own
vision of what it is to be a “good judge.”
In November 2008, Judge Posner sat down for an interview with a
class on the study of judicial behavior at Duke Law School. The class,
led by Professor Mitu Gulati and Dean David Levi, had read the book
as part of a year-long review of the empirical literature on judicial
decisionmaking. Their conversation ranged over various topics,
including reaction to the book, Posner’s experience as a judge, and
future directions for empirical studies of the judiciary.

1. RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM: BLURRED FOCUS, HALTING STEPS
(2007).
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001).
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, REMAKING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE (2005).
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001).
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999).
7. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008).
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QUESTION: I am curious about the feedback you received from
judges on your book. Are they hostile to the idea of studying judges?
Given the provocative title and subject matter, I’m guessing that there
must have been much discussion of your book in the judicial
community.
JUDGE POSNER: I have received very little feedback from judges. I
don’t think that judges do much reading—at least, not much
secondary reading. The ordinary judicial job itself requires a great
amount of reading. Most judges probably figure that that is enough.
I have personal friends whom I have talked to about these issues;
people like Michael Boudin and Steve Breyer. But generally the
judicial community is not like the academic community. Judges, my
sense is, do not spend a great deal of time reflecting about what they
do and why they do it in the ways that they do it. Think about
continuing legal education for judges. It tends to be vocational. There
will be lectures about particular substantive areas of law, but rarely, if
ever, will there be lectures or discussions of the research on the study
of judges.
QUESTION: Our impression is that at least some judges are familiar
with the portion of your book that tackles the question of whether
judicial salaries should be raised. At least one of them suggested you
were perhaps not as concerned about an increased salary because of
the large amount of money you likely make from royalties on your
books. Is that the case?
JUDGE POSNER [chuckling]: I’m sorry that my views on the salary
question displeased some. I don’t make very much at all in terms of
royalties on my books. They are not big sellers. And I don’t write
them in the hope of making royalties. It is just mainly academic
writing.
QUESTION: Who was your intended audience for the book?
JUDGE POSNER: Most people write for themselves. Academic writing,
which is what this was, is not focused on an audience. I try to write
very simply. Beyond that, I don’t have a precise sense of audience.
Maybe law professors, law students, and political scientists. Not much
more than that. I didn’t expect judges to be that interested.
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QUESTION: I’d like to ask about the “good judge” concept. The book
attaches a great deal of weight to that concept. When we see judges
acting outside acceptable bounds, is that because the good judge
conception has failed to constrain?
JUDGE POSNER: I don’t think many judges are cynical. I don’t think
many would say, “I will do something different from what I am
supposed do as a judge because I can get away with it.” But that is
true in all jobs. If serious, the job holder tries to do a good job. If a
judge goes out of bounds, it might be because he thinks it is terribly
important to do so. The job description is sufficiently loose. You can
do a lot.
Judge Reinhardt, on the Ninth Circuit, for example, is a very
smart judge with a terrible reversal rate at the Supreme Court. But he
ploughs ahead. He does not have that much respect for the Supreme
Court. But he does not think of himself as an irresponsible judge. On
the Supreme Court, there were judges like Blackmun and Douglas
who pushed at the boundaries. Douglas, he really pushed the
envelope.
QUESTION: In the first part of your book you focus on how judges—
mostly federal circuit judges—make decisions as whole human beings,
not just political actors. But in the second half of the book you turn to
the Supreme Court, and you treat the Justices as purely political
decisionmakers. Is there a reason for this discrepancy, and do you
think it would make sense to apply your analysis in the first part of
the book to the Court?
JUDGE POSNER: There are two ways in which personality affects
Supreme Court Justices. The first has to do with temperament. Take,
for example, Blackmun. He was very emotional. Much of what he did
resulted from his emotional reactions to cases. O’Connor, in turn, was
very offended by how she was treated by Scalia.
The second way has to do with the differential preference for
rules and standards. Some want rules and others care less about those
rules. Breyer is clearly more comfortable with loose standards. In the
8
Eldred case, for example, the Supreme Court said in effect that
“limited times” just meant short of infinite. Breyer wanted instead a

8. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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loose multifactor test. Well, that sort of thing, I suspect, drives folks
like Scalia and Thomas crazy because of the amount of discretion that
such a test would give judges. But I don’t think that the tight rules
that the rule lovers want to adopt have any more fixity. No one has
done a study that tells us which works better at governing behavior.
Temperament affects people and so does politics. Judges are no
different.
QUESTION: What are your own political preferences?
JUDGE POSNER: I cannot talk about my party-based political
affiliations. That isn’t appropriate for me to do as a judge. On my
general political philosophy, as distinct from my preferences for any
politician or political-party platform: I started out liberal, but became
more and more conservative first during the turmoil of the late 1960s,
which I found extremely repulsive, and then when I started meeting
economists like Stigler and Coase and Friedman. I am less
dogmatically conservative today, for example, on environmental (e.g.,
global warming) matters. I was never a social or religious
conservative.
QUESTION: Is it true that you were a registered Democrat when
President Reagan nominated you to the bench?
JUDGE POSNER: Yes, but only because I wanted to vote in the
Democratic primary for a friend. It was not an issue that came up
during the confirmation process.
QUESTION: By the time you were nominated, you had already written
a number of provocative articles, including some that articulated
views on judicial behavior and one especially controversial one on the
market for babies. Did you get questioned about your research?
JUDGE POSNER: No, not at all. There were some pleasantries
exchanged, but that was it.
QUESTION: In recent years, there appears to be have been greater
scrutiny applied to judicial nominees, particularly for the Supreme
Court. What do you think the effect of that greater scrutiny has been?
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JUDGE POSNER: There has been greater scrutiny. More scrutiny has
resulted in candidates with better professional credentials. Take the
Harriet Miers affair. The Justice Department, I suspect, thought that
she was not adequately prepared to answer questions at the hearings.
The senators have staff who prepare tough questions for the
nominees. But the senators don’t know how to follow up on the
question that someone else created. The result is that if you are adept
like Roberts, you can get away with not answering the question. He
9
got away with saying things like that stuff about balls and strikes.
But even though we have more qualified judges, it is not clear
that the output is better as a result. They have better staff these days
too and a lighter workload. Still, why isn’t there better output? There
10
hasn’t been any actual improvement in the opinions. Take the Heller
case on the right to bear arms. Scalia and Stevens produced opinions
that are dazzling as research products. There were lots of citations to
esoteric material. But there was no real improvement in the value of
the opinion. At the end of the day, it may not be really that important
to have judges with better qualifications.
QUESTION: What got you interested in being a judge? Our sense is
that your career, at the time you became a judge, could have easily
gone in a different direction, with all the success that your consulting
firm Lexecon was having and the demand for your advice in antitrust
cases.
JUDGE POSNER: I had no interest in being a judge until I received a
call in June 1981 from a friend in the Justice Department who asked
me if I would consider an appointment to the Seventh Circuit. I said
of course not, but then I said give me twenty-four hours to think it
over, and after discussing it with my father and my wife and a few
others I decided to do it. Partly because I was enthusiastic about
advancing economics-oriented thinking in the judiciary, I felt that I
shouldn’t turn down the opportunity. And in part I thought it would
basically just replace consulting and some teaching and law school

9. In his confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Chief Justice
Roberts explained his belief in judicial restraint by analogizing the role of a judge to that of an
umpire in a baseball game—the umpire’s job is to call balls and strikes, whereas the pitcher and
batter play the game. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
10. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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committee work, so that I would have as much time for academic
research and writing as before—and that turned out to be true. The
consulting was lucrative, so my income plunged, but my wife didn’t
care, so neither did I, and I found consulting rather dull. I was the
head of Lexecon and the business getter, so a lot of what I did was
explaining what the firm did and some elementary principles of
economics and how they could help in litigation. And finally, I
thought writing judicial opinions would be fun, as it turned out to be.
QUESTION: Whom did you talk to about your appointment, and what
did they think—particularly your father who was very liberal?
JUDGE POSNER: My father was pretty apolitical. He was a lawyer and
thought it a great thing to be a judge. I also spoke to a former boss of
mine whom I greatly respected, Philip Elman, a Federal Trade
Commissioner—later in practice—and he reacted as my father had
done.
QUESTION: Is it true that you require that your law clerks call you
“Dick” and not “Judge”? We have heard that this annoys some of the
other judges, who think it is important they be referred to as
“judge”—that helps keep a distance between them and the others.
JUDGE POSNER: It is true that I ask my clerks to call me “Dick”
rather than “Judge.” There is a practical reason for this. I need my
clerks to be candid with me and tell me when I have made mistakes.
Forbidding them to be formal encourages them to be completely
forthright and candid in the expression of their views. I cannot get my
secretary to call me by my first name though. I tried repeatedly, but
failed.
I also tell my law clerks: “Look, when you read this draft
opinion, you may start out assuming that it will be good. Don’t do
that. I want you to presume error in tone, style, analysis, logic and so
on.” I need my law clerks to tell me where there are errors because
there are bound to be some.
QUESTION: We were wondering whether you meant for the book to
describe how you and other judges judge or to say how they should
judge. In particular, is there a message to law students about how we
should think about law or judges?
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JUDGE POSNER: I certainly intended to be descriptive. But judges
11
need to be aware that the legalistic approach can sometimes take
one to the wrong place or, at least, not very far. The legalistic
approach has become more popular and I suspect it relates to the way
law is taught these days.
QUESTION: Could you talk a little bit about the implications of what
you say in the book for law schools? It seemed like you didn’t think
that law schools did a terribly good job of bridging the gap between
the judiciary and academia. How can law schools go about fixing the
problem?
JUDGE POSNER: There are two separate questions. First, what role
should law professors and law students play in criticizing judges and
what they do? Second, what is the role of the legal academy in
monitoring and evaluating judicial performance? And relatedly, what
should be done in developing criteria of evaluation?
In terms of the measures being used to evaluate judicial
performance by academics, like number of citations and number of
cases reprinted in casebooks and reversal rate, the problem is in
coming up with weights to give the different measures. The weighting
that is done ends up being arbitrary. But the project is a good one, if
the weighting problem can be solved.
But the criticism of opinions is not terribly useful. Judges don’t
pay a lot of attention to these critiques. They don’t think law
professors are giving them much in the way of useful, constructive
criticism. And it is not that useful to be looking backwards at errors in
past opinions. By the time a judge reads a law review article
criticizing or analyzing an opinion of his, it is likely that a lot of time
has gone by since the opinion was written. Happy judges don’t want
to look back at their mistakes. Of my 2,500 or so opinions, a number

11. Judge Posner explains that legalism is a theory of judicial decisionmaking in which the
judge lacks discretion, as doctors treat an illness:
The treatment decisions of physicians are determined . . . by the physicians’
understanding of the structure of the physical world, and the aspiration of the legalist
is that a judicial decision be determined by a body of rules constituting “the law”
rather than by factors that are personal to judges, in the sense of varying among them,
such as ideology, personality, and personal background. The ideal legalist decision is
the product of a syllogism in which a rule of law supplies the major premise, the facts
of the case supply the minor one, and the decision is the conclusion.
POSNER, supra note 7, at 41.

POSNER IN FINAL FINAL.DOC

1814

5/5/2009 4:33:05 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1807

are doubtless wrong. If I brooded over all the mistakes in those
opinions, I’d be unhappy. Who wants that?
I had a case that involved bits and pieces of evidence of
12
discrimination. I talked about the “mosaic of discrimination.” Years
later, I realized that a “mosaic” rule had emerged. But that was
13
ridiculous. You don’t need a mosaic. Judges love clichés. They are
always grasping at clichés.
Law professors are not performing the service for the judiciary
that they used to. We still have a common law system and law
professors used to perform a useful function in cleaning up and
clarifying the array of cases that emerged from the courts. Treatises
were useful and so were restatements. They identified and dispatched
outlier cases and created a coherent body of law. That was the kind of
work that engaged the leading academics.
Today, the leading academics do not see intellectual profit in
writing a treatise or a restatement. Today, cutting-edge law articles
use social science. They draw from fields like psychology, economics,
et cetera. They don’t work with doctrine as much. Much of the
current academic publishing ends up being too academic and esoteric.
As for the restatements and treatises today, they are competent. But
the work of producing them is not engaging the leading academics
any longer.
QUESTION: In light of the motivations for your book, do you have any
advice for law students who are about to go into practice?
JUDGE POSNER: With regard to trial lawyers, I have little to say.
There are good and bad trial lawyers. One of the defining
characteristics of good trial lawyers is that they are well organized. I
used to teach a course on evidence combined with trial advocacy. My
experience was that the rules of evidence were useless. First, I notice
from my forays into the district court as a volunteer trial judge that

12. Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736–37 (7th Cir. 1994) (allowing a case to
survive summary judgment because the plaintiff presented a “combination of ambiguous
statements, suspicious timing, discrimination against other employees, and other pieces of
evidence none conclusive in itself but together composing a convincing mosaic of discrimination
against the plaintiff”).
13. See Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 904 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[I]t
was not the intention in Troupe to promulgate a new standard, whereby circumstantial evidence
in a discrimination or retaliation case must, if it is to preclude summary judgment for the
defendant, have a mosaic-like character.”).
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the lawyers who do not make any (or at least make very, very few)
objections often won. This makes sense because the jury draws
negative inferences from objections that are sustained. I also found
that with most evidentiary objections, the lawyer could just rephrase
the question and the objection would disappear. An evidence class
really should be about trial advocacy. That is, about how to get the
evidence you need into the case. Students in the class would play
different roles in our mock trials. I really enjoyed this.
As for materials, NITA, the National Institute of Trial Advocacy,
prepares case files. I used those. They are brilliantly done materials—
realistic trial simulations. What I noticed was that some students had
an uncanny knack for the courtroom. Others, who might have done
well on an exam, were not able to tackle the courtroom. Beyond
personality, those who are organized do better, as I said.
In appellate practice, the lawyers are often quite bad, sometimes
awful. I don’t understand why. I sometimes wonder whether there is
an oxygen deficiency in the courtroom. I sometimes become
exasperated. I’ll give you an example. We have a red light that goes
on at the end of the time given for oral argument. Last week, we had
an argument and the light went on. I had another question for the
lawyer, though, and I asked it. He asked for permission to answer.
That was ridiculous. I had just asked him the question! And then it
happened a second and third time during the same set of oral
arguments; a question would be asked after the red light went on and
the lawyer would ask for permission to answer. By the third time, it
became truly stupid. Why were the lawyers spending their time on
this red-light nonsense?
One of the other things they do that is frustrating has to do with
leaving time for rebuttal. If you don’t leave yourself time for rebuttal,
the other guy can say anything. It is nuts not to leave some time for
rebuttal, but lawyers will often use up their time. I end up often giving
them some time anyway.
In making their arguments, too often the lawyers try to hammer
us by citing opinions—X v. Y, A v. B, and so on. I try to tell them not
to bother us with all these citations. It is unlikely that some prior
opinion will completely decide the case. It is too difficult to map on
the facts of some other case exactly. And the lawyers don’t seem to
understand that we are not specialists—we don’t spend that much
time analyzing those prior cases.
I had a case last month that centered on a telecommunications
issue. I read the briefs and didn’t understand what was going on at all.
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So, when the case was argued, I asked for a simple explanation of
what was going on. The same lawyer who had submitted an
incomprehensible brief was able to explain the issue in five minutes.
It’s as if lawyers had absolutely no conception about the
conditions under which judges work. We don’t know that much in the
first place and we don’t spend that much time preparing for the
individual case.
Maybe all this is the result of the growing gap between practice
and the academy. Why can’t the lawyers recognize what kinds of
constraints judges operate under?
Last month, I heard a big criminal case. Lots of money was at
stake. After making his argument, one of the lawyers was walking
away from the podium and he swung around and made a motion. It
was so strange. He could have submitted a written motion after the
argument. I ignored the oral motion. I’m not sure the other judges on
the panel even heard it.
QUESTION: I’m interested on your view about how judges should
tackle the inevitable empirical questions that arise at trial. Should
judges confine themselves to the empirical evidence that the parties
bring to the case in their briefs? Or should they be allowed to go
beyond the briefs and recognize empirical realities about the world or
about how individuals respond to incentives and so on?
JUDGE POSNER: My focus in the book is on appellate judges. I do find
trials interesting though. I often volunteer to sit on the district court
for trials. I typically do not do criminal cases because I am
uncomfortable with having to do criminal sentencing because that is
something that the district judges receive extensive instructions
about, and we appellate judges do not. But I thoroughly enjoy the
civil trials. Over my twenty-seven years of doing these trials, I have
continued to enjoy doing them.
One question that comes up all the time is whom to believe.
Empirical judgments about the world inevitably come into play here.
With a criminal trial, I imagine that different judges have different
judgments about whether they are inclined to believe the cops or the
defendant. I know that when judges make these empirical judgments,
they are reacting to their own experiences. They are driven by their
preconceptions, their experiences, to a very great extent.
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QUESTION: I think we agree. So much of law is about facts about
institutions. When we think a court is wrong, it is often that we think
it has erred about institutional facts. When I was a judge in California,
I worked on an open primary case. It was likely to get appealed no
matter what we decided at the lower level. So, we tried to take
enough evidence at the trial so as to give the appeals court an
adequate factual basis from which to work, to make its decision. The
district court has the mechanisms and tools to develop facts. The
appeals court is limited in this respect; its hands are tied in terms of
the facts.
JUDGE POSNER: When the appeals court finds itself with inadequate
facts, which is not infrequently, the lawyers are partially at fault as
well. I am distressed at the poor job that lawyers do in terms of giving
us facts. Lawyers don’t help us enough in helping us get to sensible
decisions.
15
I wrote the opinion in the Crawford case. It was affirmed 6-3,
16
with the conservatives and Stevens in the majority. On my court, the
vote was 2-1. The question was whether the Indiana voter ID law
disenfranchised too many legitimate voters. On the other side was the
interest in protecting against voter fraud. There was no evidence on
either side. What ended up being decisive in the end in the thinking of
the majority in my case (and this is reflected in our opinion) was
simply that we didn’t want to micromanage state election laws. If we
got into that business, where would we stop?
QUESTION: In our seminar, we have been reading a number of
articles coming out of the modern legal origins literature that seem to
17
build on your early work on the efficiency of the common law. Our
sense from your more recent writing, though, is that your current

14. The questioner is David F. Levi, Dean of the Duke University School of Law and
former Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
15. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 128 S. Ct.
1610 (2008).
16. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (Stevens, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. & Kennedy, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court); id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment).
17. E.g., Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453 (2003); Daniel Klerman & Paul
J. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from 18th Century England, 7 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 1 (2005); Paul J. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek
Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001).
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views diverge from those who have been asserting the efficiency of
the common law and its superiority over civil law. Is that so?
JUDGE POSNER: Much of my academic writing has been devoted to
trying to explain common law doctrines and procedures on economic
grounds; that is a major theme of my book Economic Analysis of
Law, now in its seventh edition. The idea that common law is more
efficient than civil law goes back at least to Max Weber. Weber
observed that English law seemed more supportive of commercial
activity than civil law. He didn’t have a good answer for why, though.
My sense is that it has to do with the fact that English judges were
appointed from practice. They knew about and understood business
interests. They had learned about the practicalities of commercial
transactions as lawyers. Brian Simpson, for example, had argued that
the common law was not as chaotic as it seemed, because of the
common social backgrounds of the judges. And in most common law
areas, it is rarely feasible for courts to advance other social policies
than economic efficiency. The problem with civil judges is that they
are insulated from real judging. And there isn’t the luxury of
academic leisure to study and learn.
The problem with the claims in the legal origins literature is the
degree of path dependence assumed. It is just not clear why
seventeenth-century colonial origins should matter quite so much.
Forget the origins part. The fact is that there are different political
cultures. The European civil law systems are so much more legalistic
and bureaucratic. You are a judge all your professional life.
QUESTION: Could you talk about your view of international law and
the use of materials from other jurisdictions? Should the use of those
external materials not be more important?
JUDGE POSNER: Legal cultures are very different. It is treacherous to
assume that a foreign culture, and its corresponding legal system,
should bear upon what we do. What the Israeli Supreme Court does,
for example, is not useful. There is no real legal structure there. The
government is corrupt and dysfunctional, and judges perforce fill the
void: they are “good government” and are respected accordingly, and
this enhances their political power. In other words, the reason the
judges have so much power in that context is that they are honest and
the politicians are corrupt. It is a different world out there. It is fine to
read those foreign opinions, but not to use them as authority.
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Think of capital punishment. It might be abolished as a formal
matter in a hundred countries, yet some of them might be
implementing capital punishment extrajudicially. Referring to the
foreign decisions for the most part is little more than fig leafing. If
you allow judges more sources of authority, you give them more
discretion.
In the book, I also emphasized the selectivity with which these
foreign decisions or rules are cited in our courts. For example, most
countries are more conservative than we are on abortion rights. So, in
that context, judges tend not to look to foreign courts for authority.
But they do with respect to the death penalty.
QUESTION: Your book discusses a vast literature of empirical studies
of judicial behavior. Why do you think judges do not pay more
attention to that literature?
JUDGE POSNER: A big problem is that most studies are not done by
lawyers. When you read something by someone in a different field,
you tend to discount it. I was just reading an article by the political
scientist, Harold Spaeth, who has done a ton of empirical work on the
18
topic of judicial behavior. His article talked about Bentham and
Holmes in ways that lawyers and legal academics would probably find
inadequate and frustrating. Now, that portion of his article was not
that important to his actual study. But it grates lawyers to see that he
does not take seriously what they consider important. And that
becomes a tempting and convenient way to dismiss everything else he
says because we have already decided that he is an outsider who
doesn’t understand what we do.
There are perhaps two other reasons. First, judges and law
professors have an investment in thinking that the judicial process is
technical and legalistic. The political science model undermines that.
Second, judges aren’t sure how they should respond to this work.
They think rightly or wrongly that they are doing the best they can.
So, what do they do if faced with the results of political-science
studies? They don’t really see the payoff. If you can tell them

18. E.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY
WILL passim (1999) (contending that Justices privilege their preexisting views of the law over
precedent when deciding cases); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL passim (1993) (arguing that Justices implement policy
preferences in their decisions).
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something useful that they could use in their work—something that
would help them do their job better—that could help. Maybe they
would pay attention to that.
I’ll mention a couple of studies that I am working on with Lee
Epstein and Bill Landes. One has to do with the question of why
judges do not dissent more. Judges do not dissent every time there is
a disagreement about the outcome of a case. So, the question is, what
do you get out of dissenting and what do you lose? This is a question
that judges ask when they have to make the choice about whether to
dissent. If our study can produce convincing evidence on the costs and
benefits (not pecuniary of course) of dissent, perhaps it will change
behavior.
It turns out that dissents are very rarely cited. A judge might
want to know that. Supreme Court Justices dissent a lot. They have
much more time to do so because of their control of their docket.
Also, the Supreme Court pays less attention to precedent. On the
court of appeals, we have a lot less time for dissenting, and we pay
more attention to precedent and so are less likely to overrule a case
on the basis that it contained a forceful dissent.
A second study that we are doing is of judges asking questions
during oral argument. It turns out that you can predict the outcome of
a case by looking at the pattern of questioning. The side that is asked
more questions tends to lose.
The initial thinking on a case tends to be important, probably
more so on the court of appeals than on the Supreme Court. On the
court of appeals, we have our conference and then we discuss the
cases. The vote there is tentative, but tends to have momentum. At
conference, the judges vote in reverse order of seniority (it is the
opposite in the Supreme Court). The senior judge worries that if the
two others disagree, there is going to be an uphill battle to change
their minds.
The questions asked at oral argument are a way of talking to the
other judges. If judges understood this better, it might affect how they
behave in oral argument.
I dissent rarely. I go along sometimes even when I disagree. Our
disagreement may simply reflect differences in our experience. If you
don’t have great confidence that you are necessarily right, you won’t
dissent as much.
The conversation among lawyers, judges, and political scientists
might improve if law schools hired more political scientists who do
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research on judicial behavior. Lee Epstein, a political scientist whose
appointment is at Northwestern Law School, is a good example.
Being in a law school environment exposes her to the institutional
details that lawyers and judges consider.
QUESTION: Your book talks about the value of looking to judicial
biographies as a source of insight into the behavior of judges. But
biographies of judges, particularly Supreme Court Justices, tend to be
written by their former law clerks or other people who are close to
them. And that might mean that the stories being told are biased.
Wouldn’t it be better to have scholars do in-depth case studies of
judges?
19

JUDGE POSNER: I thought something like my book on Cardozo was
more useful as a way of studying judicial behavior than full-length
biographies, but the suggestion hasn’t been picked up. Andy
20
Kaufman’s biography of Cardozo, though lengthy, is the best of the
21
judicial biographies. Bruce Murphy’s biography of Douglas is also
good, though it has inaccuracies. I published an article on judicial
22
biography some years ago, Judicial Biography, that you might find
useful.
QUESTION: But it is hard to imagine any judge allowing a researcher
to do a case study. Judges appear to want to preserve the mystique of
what goes on in their chambers.
JUDGE POSNER: I think you are being unduly skeptical. Judges might
be willing to open up their chambers to researchers. I would be open
to that. If there is less mystique about what happens with judges and
their decisionmaking, advocates would be able to make better
arguments.
QUESTION: What about research on state courts?
JUDGE POSNER: The state courts are interesting. I recently gave a
talk to a group of state court judges. It was an annual meeting for
19. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1993).
20. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998).
21. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS (2003).
22. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 502 (1995).
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state court judges and it was fascinating. They had this interesting and
funny issue come up with respect to elections of judges. Imagine you
are the judge in a county and you can be assigned to another county.
If it is the period before an election, some of the judges said, you will
want to get assigned elsewhere. The goal, if you are standing for
reelection, is to avoid scrutiny. The goal in getting elected is to avoid
negative attention, to be invisible. Apparently, the incentives are not
to affirmatively show that one is doing a good job. The incentives are
to avoid being blamed for the decision on some case in the short
period before an election where people are paying at least some
attention. Most of the time, there is no attention paid.
There is another angle on the study of judges that came up in my
conversations with these state judges. Some judges asked me about
specialized business courts and whether they were a good thing. The
question, therefore, is one on how to study and compare those
jurisdictions where there are business courts and those where there
are not. It may be that there is less removal to federal district courts
in contexts where there is the availability of a specialized business
court. Or, there may be a greater fraction of people who choose
arbitration in their contracts. It would be interesting to find out
whether local businesses know about the quality of their local
judiciary. Do they care? Lots of specialized business judging is just a
timing thing.
QUESTION: You have been writing about judicial behavior for over
three decades. In your early articles on judicial behavior, you typically
had clear and simple models of judicial behavior. The model you
describe in this book is so much more complicated. Have your views
about judges and judging changed significantly since those early
articles?
JUDGE POSNER: After thirty years, my views have changed
significantly. I’ll give you an example. Bill Landes and I wrote about
diversity jurisdiction years ago. One sentence in the draft said
something about judges not working hard. I changed it, said it was
obviously false. I had clerked and had observed that some judges
didn’t work that hard, but I thought that others worked hard, surely
they must have been. I was just deceived.
I also exaggerated the formalist commitments of judges in those
early articles. Law clerks come away with a very unrealistic view of
judges.
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QUESTION: After thirty years on the bench, you are a long way from
your days as a clerk. Do you find yourself getting bored?
JUDGE POSNER: Not at all. The work is not boring. The variety of
cases is amazing and the mix of those cases keeps changing. This is
especially the case with the civil docket. Immigration, child
pornography, intellectual property—all of these have become big
sources of cases. Plus, rarely is there an appeal without uncertainty
about the legal issue. The work continues to be interesting.
Maybe in the future I will try to sit by designation on some of the
other courts. The First Circuit is a good court and I have friends
there, like Michael Boudin. It would be interesting to see how the
other circuits operate and what their practices are. In particular,
judges may vary in terms of their management styles. Justice Powell
had a whole system where the clerks took turns on revising the
opinion and making sure it fit a certain structure and style. And the
clerks had different roles and different responsibilities; the
production of opinions was highly formalized. That strikes me as
awful. Surely, many judges cannot be using such a structure.

